The Allegation
The accusation that Iran obtained weapons from Israel during its war with Saddam is decades old. In fact, it dates to the era of Ayatollah Khomeini, when Western media and Saddam’s propaganda apparatus, joined more consequentially by Bani Sadr—recently stripped of power and newly settled in France—began circulating the claim. The first rebuttal came from Khomeini himself, who dismissed the reports as enemy propaganda and declared that he “did not even consider Israel to be worthy to deal with,” much less to purchase arms from. An Iranian press attaché at the time put the matter even more bluntly: “We have so many weapons from the arsenal built by the Shah that we do not require Israeli weapons.”
The McFarlane Affair
The McFarlane affair, in which the Reagan administration dispatched the president’s national security adviser to Iran in an effort to secure the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon, was facilitated by an arms dealer named Manouchehr Ghorbanifar, an Iranian based in Europe, who helped lay the groundwork for the deal.
Washington’s reasoning rested on the assumption that, given the nature of the Islamic Revolution and its popularity among the Iranian people, as well as among certain Palestinian and Lebanese groups, it could reach an understanding with the Iranian authorities under which the Iranians would use their influence over Lebanese militant factions to secure the release of American captives held in Lebanon. The Iranian logic, on the other hand, was straightforward. Iran’s allies had captured enemy combatants and were holding them hostage, and any arrangement to secure their release must compel the enemy to sell weapons that Iran desperately needed for its war against Saddam, an enemy backed by both the Eastern and Western blocs, while Iran itself remained under siege. In this respect, the very structure of the deal was anti-imperialist in character, with the weaker party compelling the stronger power to sell arms at gunpoint rather than “negotiating” its surrender in exchange for weapons, as the Americans were doing with their own proxies across the region.
Even the entry of an American delegation into Iran proved problematic for the Americans, who understood that they were not welcome. According to an Iranian source published in 2021, whose accuracy I leave to the judgment of readers, McFarlane arrived in Iran as one of five passengers aboard an Irish aircraft, traveling under a false name and with a forged passport. The choice of an Irish aircraft was probably deliberate. Given Iran’s sympathetic relationship with the Irish resistance, such an aircraft was less likely to provoke a backlash than, for example, a Soviet or British one. Had the Iranians been informed in advance that McFarlane was among the passengers and that he was the White House national security adviser, they would not have granted him a visa, since Iran’s policy formally precluded relations with the United States. He therefore entered the country under a false identity. At the airport, however, it was announced that the passenger was in fact Mr. McFarlane, the White House national security adviser, who had come to negotiate with Iranian officials. The Iranian authorities objected, and no senior official was willing to receive him. McFarlane consequently waited two or three days before finally meeting with a representative of the Ministry of Defense. Deeply aggrieved by his treatment, he reportedly remarked that had he traveled to the Soviet Union to purchase fur, he would have met Mr. Gorbachev several times over, yet in Iran not a single senior official was willing to meet with him.
Iranian state media, in an article written in 2019, went even further, claiming that as soon as McFarlane landed in Iran, Iranian officials immediately decided to detain the individuals at the airport in order to determine their purpose. The aircraft was taken to a military base, where the passengers were detained. They remained there for three and a half hours while Iranian officials deliberated over what to do. The matter was ultimately referred to Imam Khomeini for a decision. Khomeini instructed: “Do not speak with them, do not receive their message, just see what they are saying and for what purpose they have come to Iran.” They were then transferred to a hotel, where they claimed to have brought a message that Mr. Reagan had sent, along with “gifts” for Iran’s officials. If this report is accurate, the response—detention, suspicion, and refusal to engage at a high level—is hardly the behaviour of a state seeking arms from Israel. It is, rather, the behaviour of a state presented with an unwelcome and unauthorized overture.
Anonymous Market Transactions Versus State-Level Procurement
This is where the accusation first took root, and where the story becomes considerably more complicated. It is true that Iran received American weapons in exchange for the release of hostages, an undeniably anti-imperialist manoeuvre that forced the enemy to make concessions at the barrel of a gun while the rest of the world stood behind Saddam. In confirming these arms purchases, some Iranian media outlets have reported that the dealer responsible for facilitating the transfer of the American weapons may have been Jewish, although the Iranian authorities themselves were apparently unaware of his background at the time. These reports, however, do not claim that he was a Jewish Israeli citizen, although I consider that possibility plausible. Even assuming, therefore, that Iran obtained certain weapons through Jewish dealers acting on behalf of the American administration, this would still not amount to Iran receiving Israeli arms.
First, the Jewish identity of these dealers does not, by itself, make them Israeli.
Second, the Iranians understood themselves to be negotiating with the American administration, and that was the substance of the arrangement as far as they were concerned. Their attention was therefore focused on the quality and affordability of the weapons and on the good faith of the Americans in carrying out the deal. They paid no particular attention to the identity or personal background of the individuals acting as representatives of the Reagan administration.
Third, any affiliations those individuals may have had with other countries or intelligence organisations were entirely separate from the Iranian side and had no bearing on the transaction. The dealers were acting as representatives of the American administration, and the Iranians understood the arms to be supplied through the United States.
Fourth, had the Iranians suspected that any of the dealers were acting on behalf of another foreign government or intelligence service, particularly Israel, they would not have dealt with them at all.
Finally, even in the most extreme hypothetical scenario—assuming that the dealers were Jewish Americans and that the weapons had, in fact, been shipped from Israel—the Iranians would still have been unaware of their Israeli origin. From their perspective, these were American weapons supplied by the United States as part of a deal Iran had coerced Washington to make in exchange for the release of American spies.
In this respect, the accusers deliberately conflate the presence of Jewish intermediaries in the global arms market with a state‑to‑state transfer between Israel and Iran. No such transfer ever occurred.
Beyond the Arms Allegation
Some have gone beyond the mere accusation of Israeli arms shipments to Iran, claiming that Israel even took part in the war by supporting Iran against Saddam Hussein. This claim can be refuted through a geopolitical analysis of that era—namely, the Iranian activity in Lebanon against Israel, the Iranian post-1979 state ideology, the relationship of this revolutionary state with Palestinian movements, and, most importantly, the overt, transparent, and firm American support for Saddam Hussein during the war.
As for the Iranian state’s ideology, Israel’s national security architecture, particularly since the 1980s, has been built on the premise that the Islamic Republic represents an existential threat—a newly established state whose Supreme Leader had described Israel as a “cancerous tumor” that must be eradicated, while its foreign-policy establishment regarded the colonial state, after the United States, as the foremost enemy to be confronted. For that matter, I would consider the argument that Israel may have preferred both Iran and Saddam to exhaust one another through prolonged conflict to be plausible, if still debatable, given Israel’s view of the countries surrounding it as potential security threats. But the claim that Israel “supported Iran during the war” requires us to believe that Israel deliberately acted against its own most fundamental security interests.
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that the United States was the principal power encouraging and facilitating Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Iran, driven largely by the Iranian seizure of the U.S. embassy, the capture of American diplomats, and, by those actions, what Washington regarded as a de facto declaration of war. Beyond that initial lobbying, the United States and major European states—Israel’s indispensable patrons—tilted toward Iraq throughout the conflict, supporting Saddam through virtually every available means, from satellite intelligence and weapons supplies to diplomatic and economic measures. This support also included removing Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and extending agricultural credits. It is also important to remember that Iran and the United States clashed directly in the Gulf after Washington intervened on Saddam’s behalf, with both sides suffering casualties. Consequently, for Israel to circumvent American policy by independently arming Iran—rather than the United States itself being compelled, under coercion, to provide weapons—would have risked straining the very alliance that underwrote Israel’s security.
Most important of all, Iran’s hostility toward Israel was evident from the earliest days of the Islamic Republic. One of the revolution’s earliest and most prominent gestures in this regard came in February 1979, when the newly established revolutionary government severed Iran’s relations with Israel, took over the former Israeli mission in Tehran, and handed the building to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which subsequently established the first Palestinian diplomatic mission there. Yasser Arafat himself visited Tehran for the occasion, publicly hailed the revolution, and received a pledge of Iranian support for the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, by 1982, Iranian and IRGC personnel were directly involved in the Lebanese Civil War in opposition to the Israeli invasion, including by arming, financing, and supporting various Palestinian and Shia forces fighting Israeli forces. According to a CIA document (which I have posted on Twitter), approximately 2,000 Iranian personnel were present in Lebanon during the 1982 Israeli invasion, while nearly 500 Iranians were besieged in Beirut itself, fighting alongside the PLO against Israeli forces. This alone, even setting aside Iran’s earlier support for the Palestinian resistance, would have marked the newly established Islamic Republic as a potentially existential threat to Israel. Iran was now directly involved in a conflict bearing on Israel’s immediate security and regional position. Iran’s subsequent role in the formation of Hezbollah, together with the extraordinary casualties suffered by American and Israeli forces during the occupation of Lebanon—and the direct responsibility they attributed to Iranian actors for many of those losses—only compounded this perception. Under these circumstances, supporting Iran, let alone independently supplying it with arms, would have been suicidal for Israel, given how early the revolutionary state had already demonstrated its hostility toward it.


